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Abstract
We study the black-box attacks on graph neural networks (GNNs) under a novel
and realistic constraint: attackers have access to only a subset of nodes in the
network, and they can only attack a small number of them. A node selection step
is essential under this setup. We demonstrate that the structural inductive biases
of GNN models can be an effective source for this type of attacks. Specifically,
by exploiting the connection between the backward propagation of GNNs and
random walks, we show that the common gradient-based white-box attacks can
be generalized to the black-box setting via the connection between the gradient
and an importance score similar to PageRank. In practice, we find attacks based
on this importance score indeed increase the classification loss by a large margin,
but they fail to significantly increase the mis-classification rate. Our theoretical
and empirical analyses suggest that there is a discrepancy between the loss and
mis-classification rate, as the latter presents a diminishing-return pattern when the
number of attacked nodes increases. Therefore, we propose a greedy procedure
to correct the importance score that takes into account of the diminishing-return
pattern. Experimental results show that the proposed procedure can significantly
increase the mis-classification rate of common GNNs on real-world data without
access to model parameters nor predictions.
1 Introduction
Graph neural networks (GNNs) [20], the family of deep learning models on graphs, have shown
promising empirical performance on various applications of machine learning to graph data, such
as recommender systems [25], social network analysis [11], and drug discovery [15]. Like other
deep learning models, GNNs have also been shown to be vulnerable under adversarial attacks [28],
which has recently attracted increasing research interest [8]. Indeed, adversarial attacks have been
an efficient tool to analyze both the theoretical properties as well as the practical accountability
of graph neural networks. As graph data have more complex structures than image or text data,
researchers have come up with diverse adversarial attack setups. For example, there are different
tasks (node classification and graph classification), assumptions of attacker’s knowledge (white-box,
grey-box, and black-box), strategies (node feature modification and graph structure modification),
and corresponding budget or other constraints (norm of feature changes or number of edge changes).
Despite these research efforts, there is still a considerable gap between the existing attack setups and
the reality. It is unreasonable to assume that an attacker can alter the input of a large proportion of
nodes, and even if there is a budget limit, it is unreasonable to assume that they can attack any node
as they wish. For example, in a real-world social network, the attackers usually only have access to a
few bot accounts, and they are unlikely to be among the top nodes in the network; it is difficult for
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the attackers to hack and alter the properties of celebrity accounts. Moreover, an attacker usually
has limited knowledge about the underling machine learning model used by the platform (e.g., they
may roughly know what types of models are used but have no access to the model parameters or
training labels). Motivated by the real-world scenario of attacks, in this paper we study a new type of
black-box adversarial attack for node classification tasks, which is more restricted and more realistic,
assuming that the attacker has no access to the model parameters or predictions. Our setup differs
from existing work with a novel constraint on node access, where attackers only have access to a
subset of nodes in the graph, and they can only manipulate a small number of them.
The proposed black-box adversarial attack requires a two-step procedure: 1) selecting a small subset
of nodes to attack under the limits of node access; 2) altering the node attributes or edges under a
per-node budget. In this paper, we focus on the first step and study the node selection strategy. The
key insight of the proposed strategy lies in the observation that, with no access to the GNN parameters
or predictions, the strong structural inductive biases of the GNN models can be exploited as an
effective information source of attacks. The structural inductive biases encoded by various neural
architectures (e.g., the convolution kernel in convolutional neural networks) play important roles in
the success of deep learning models. GNNs have even more explicit structural inductive biases due to
the graph structure and their heavy weight sharing design. Theoretical analyses have shown that the
understanding of structural inductive biases could lead to better designs of GNN models [23, 10].
From a new perspective, our work demonstrates that such structural inductive biases can turn into
security concerns in a black-box attack, as the graph structure is usually exposed to the attackers.
Following this insight, we derive a node selection strategy with a formal analysis of the proposed
black-box attack setup. By exploiting the connection between the backward propagation of GNNs and
random walks, we first generalize the gradient-norm in a white-box attack into a model-independent
importance score similar to the PageRank. In practice, attacking the nodes with high importance
scores increases the classification loss significantly but does not generate the same effect on the
mis-classification rate. Our theoretical and empirical analyses suggest that such discrepancy is due to
the diminishing-return effect of the mis-classification rate. We further propose a greedy correction
procedure for calculating the importance scores. Experiments on three real-world benchmark datasets
and popular GNN models show that the proposed attack strategy significantly outperforms baseline
methods. We summarize our main contributions as follows:
1. We propose a novel setup of black-box attacks for GNNs with a constraint of limited node
access, which is by far the most restricted and realistic compared to existing work.
2. We demonstrate that the structural inductive biases of GNNs can be exploited as an effective
information source of black-box adversarial attacks.
3. We analyze the discrepancy between classification loss and mis-classification rate and
propose a practical greedy method of adversarial attacks for node classification tasks.
4. We empirically verify the effectiveness of the proposed method on three benchmark datasets
with popular GNN models.
2 Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Attack on GNNs
The study of adversarial attacks on graph neural networks has surged recently. A taxonomy of existing
work has been summarized by Jin et al. [8], and we give a brief introduction here. First, there are two
types of machine learning tasks on graphs that are commonly studied, node-level classification and
graph-level classification. We focus on the node-level classification in this paper. Next, there are a
couple of choices of the attack form. For example, the attack can happen either during model training
(poisoning) or during model testing (evasion); the attacker may aim to mislead the prediction on
specific nodes (targeted attack) [28] or damage the overall task performance (untargeted attack) [27];
the adversarial perturbation can be done by modifying node features, adding or deleting edges, or
injecting new nodes [16]. Our work belongs to untargeted evasion attacks. For the adversarial
perturbation, most existing works of untargeted attacks apply global constraints on the proportion of
node features or the number of edges to be altered. Our work sets a novel local constraint on node
access, which is more realistic in practice: perturbation on top (e.g., celebrity) nodes is prohibited
and only a small number of nodes can be perturbed. Finally, depending on the attacker’s knowledge
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about the GNN model, existing work can be split into three categories: white-box attacks [21, 4, 19]
have access to full information about the model, including model parameters, input data, and labels;
grey-box attacks [27, 28, 16] have partial information about the model and the exact setups vary in
a range; in the most challenging setting, black-box attacks [5, 1, 3] can only access the input data
and sometimes the black-box predictions of the model. In this work, we consider an even more strict
black-box attack setup, where model predictions are invisible to the attackers. As far as we know, the
only existing works that conduct untargeted black-box attacks without access to model predictions
are those by Bojchevski and Günnemann [1] and Chang et al. [3]. However both of them require the
access to embeddings of nodes, which are prohibited as well in our setup.
2.2 Structural Inductive Bias of GNNs
While having an extremely restricted black-box setup, we demonstrate that effective adversarial
attacks are still possible due to the strong and explicit structural inductive biases of GNNs.
Structural inductive biases refer to the structures encoded by various neural architectures, such as
the weight sharing mechanisms in convolution kernels of convolutional neural networks, or the
gating mechanisms in recurrent neural networks. Such neural architectures have been recognized
as a key factor for the success of deep learning models [26], which (partially) motivate some
recent developments of neural architecture search [26], Bayesian deep learning [18], Lottery Ticket
Hypothesis [6], etc. The natural graph structure and the heavy weight sharing mechanism grant GNN
models even more explicit structural inductive biases. Indeed, GNN models have been theoretically
shown to share similar behaviours as Weisfeiler-Lehman tests [13, 22] or random walks [23]. On the
positive side, such theoretical analyses have led to better GNN model designs [23, 10].
Our work instead studies the negative impact of the structural inductive biases in the context of
adversarial attacks: when the graph structure is exposed to the attacker, such structural information
can turn into the knowledge source for an attack. While most existing attack strategies more-or-less
utilize some structural properties of GNNs, they are utilized in a data-driven manner which requires
querying the GNN model, e.g., learning to edit the graph via a trial-and-error interaction with the
GNN model [5]. We formally establish connections between the structural properties and attack
strategies without any queries to the GNN model.
3 Principled Black-Box Attack Strategies with Limited Node Access
In this section, we derive principled strategies to attack GNNs under the novel black-box setup with
limited node access. We first analyze the corresponding white-box attack problem in Section 3.2 and
then adapt the theoretical insights from the white-box setup to the black-box setup and propose a
black-box attack strategy in Section 3.3. Finally, in Section 3.4, we correct the proposed strategy by
taking into account of the diminishing-return effect for the mis-classification rate.
3.1 Preliminary Notations
We first introduce necessary notations. We denote a graph as G = (V,E), where V = {1, 2, . . . , N}
is the set of N nodes, and E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges. For a node classification problem,
the nodes of the graph are collectively associated with node features X ∈ RN×D and labels y ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,K}N , where D is the dimensionality of the feature vectors and K is the number of classes.
Each node i’s local neighborhood including itself is denoted as Ni = {j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E} ∪ {i},
and its degree as di = |Ni|. To ease the notation, for any matrix A ∈ RD1×D2 in this paper, we refer
Aj to the transpose of the j-th row of the matrix, i.e., Aj ∈ RD2 .
GNN models. Given the graph G, a GNN model is a function fG : RN×D → RN×K that maps the
node features X to output logits of each node. We denote the output logits of all nodes as a matrix
H ∈ RN×K and H = fG(X). A GNN fG is usually built by stacking a certain number (L) of layers,
with the l-th layer, 1 ≤ l ≤ L, taking the following form:
H
(l)
i = σ
∑
j∈Ni
αijWlH
(l−1)
j
 , (1)
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where H(l) ∈ RN×Dl is the hidden representation of nodes with Dl dimensions, output by the l-th
layer; Wl is a learnable linear transformation matrix; σ is an element-wise nonlinear activation
function; and different GNNs have different normalization terms αij . For instance, αij = 1/
√
didj
or αij = 1/di in Graph Convolutional Networks (GCN) [9]. In addition, H(0) = X and H = H(L).
Random walks. A random walk [12] on G is specified by the matrix of transition probabilities,
M ∈ RN×N , where
Mij =
{
1/di, if (i, j) ∈ E or j = i,
0, otherwise.
Each Mij represents the probability of transiting from i to j at any given step of the random walk.
And powering the transition matrix by t gives us the t-step transition matrix M t.
3.2 White-Box Adversarial Attacks with Limited Node Access
Problem formulation. Given a classification loss L : RN×K × {1, . . . ,K}N → R, the problem of
white-box attack with limited node access can be formulated as an optimization problem as follows:
max
S⊆V
L(H, y) (2)
subject to |S| ≤ r, di ≤ m, ∀i ∈ S
H = f(τ(X,S)),
where r,m ∈ Z+ respectively specify the maximum number of nodes and the maximum degree of
nodes that can be attacked. Intuitively, we treat high-degree nodes as a proxy of celebrity accounts
in a social network. For simplicity, we have omitted the subscript G of the learned GNN classifier
fG. The function τ : RN×D × 2V → RN×D perturbs the feature matrix X based on the selected
node set S (i.e., attack set). Under the white-box setup, theoretically τ can also be optimized to
maximize the loss. However, as our goal is to study the node selection strategy under the black-box
setup, we set τ as a pre-determined function. In particular, we define the j-th row of the output of
τ as τ(X,S)j = Xj + 1[j ∈ S], where  ∈ RD is a small constant noise vector constructed by
attackers’ domain knowledge about the features. In other words, the same small noise vector is added
to the features of every attacked node.
We use the Carlili-Wagner loss for our analysis, a close approximation of cross-entropy loss and has
been used in the analysis of adversarial attacks on image classifiers [2]:
L(H, y) ,
N∑
j=1
Lj(Hj , yj) ,
N∑
j=1
max
k∈{1,...,K}
Hjk −Hjyj . (3)
The change of loss under perturbation. Next we investigate how the overall loss changes when
we select and perturb different nodes. We define the change of loss when perturbing the node i as a
function of the perturbed feature vector x:
∆i(x) = L(f(X ′), y)− L(f(X), y), where X ′i = x and X ′j = Xj ,∀j 6= i.
To concretize the analysis, we consider the GCN model with αij = 1di in our following derivations.
Suppose f is an L-layer GCN. With the connection between GCN and random walk [23] and
Assumption 1 on the label distribution, we can show that, in expectation, the first-order Taylor
approximation ∆˜i(x) , ∆i(Xi)+(∇x∆i(Xi))T (x−Xi) is related to the sum of the i-th column of
the L-step random walk transition matrix ML. We formally summarize this finding in Proposition 1.
Assumption 1 (Label Distribution). Assume the distribution of the labels of all nodes follows the
same constant categorical distribution, i.e.,
Pr[yj = k] = qk,∀j = 1, 2, . . . , N,
where 0 < qk < 1 for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K and
∑K
k=1 qk = 1. Moreover, since the classifier f has
been well-trained and fixed, the prediction of f should capture certain relationships among the K
classes. Specifically, we assume the chance for f predicting any node j as any class k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
conditioned on the node label yj = l ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, confines to a certain distribution p(k | l), i.e.,
Pr
[(
argmax
c∈{1,...,K}
Hjc
)
= k | yj = l
]
= p(k | l).
4
Proposition 1. For an L-layer GCN model, if Assumption 1 and a technical assumption about the
GCN4 hold, then
δi , E
[
∆˜i (x) |x=τ(X,{i})i
]
= C
N∑
j=1
[ML]ji,
where C is a constant independent of i.
3.3 Adaptation from the White-Box Setup to the Black-Box Setup
Now we turn to the black-box setup where we have no access to the model parameters or predictions.
This means we are no longer able to evaluate the objective function L(H, y) of the optimization
problem (2). Proposition 1 shows that the relative ratio of δi/δj between different nodes i 6= j only
depends on the random walk transition matrix, which we can easily calculate based on the graph G.
This implies that we can still approximately optimize the problem (2) in the black-box setup.
Node selection with importance scores. Consider the change of loss under the perturbation of a
set of nodes S. If we write the change of loss as a function of the perturbed features and take the first
order Taylor expansion, which we denote as δ, we have δ =
∑
i∈S δi. Therefore δ is maximized by
the set of r nodes with degrees less than m and the largest possible δi, where m, r are the limits of
node access defined in the problem (2). Therefore, we can define an importance score for each node i
as the sum of the i-th column of ML, i.e., Ii =
∑N
j=1[M
L]ji, and simply select the nodes with the
highest importance scores to attack. We denote this strategy as RWCS (Random Walk Column Sum).
We note that RWCS is similar to PageRank. The difference between RWCS and PageRank is that the
latter uses the stationary transition matrix M∞ for a random walk with restart.
Empirically, RWCS indeed significantly increases the classification loss (as shown in Section 4.2).
The nonlinear loss actually increases linearly w.r.t. the perturbation strength (the norm of the
perturbation noise ) for a wide range, which indicates that ∆˜i is a good approximation of ∆i.
Surprisingly, RWCS fails to continue to increase the mis-classification rate (which matters more in
real applications) when the perturbation strength becomes larger. Details of this empirical finding are
shown in Figure 1 in Section 4.2. We conduct additional formal analyses on the mis-classification
rate in the following section and find a diminishing-return effect of adding more nodes to the attack
set when the perturbation strength is adequate.
3.4 Diminishing-Return of Mis-classification Rate and its Correction
Analysis of the diminishing-return effect. Our analysis is based on the investigation that each
target node i ∈ V will be mis-classified as we increase the attack set.
To assist the analysis, we first define the concepts of vulnerable function and vulnerable set below.
Definition 1 (Vulnerable Function). We define the vulnerable function gi : 2V → {0, 1} of a target
node i ∈ V as, for a given attack set S ⊆ V ,
gi(S) =
{
1, if i is mis-classified when attacking S,
0, if i is correctly-classified when attacking S.
Definition 2 (Vulnerable Set). We define the vulnerable set of a target node i ∈ V as a set of all
attack sets that could lead i to being mis-classified:
Ai , {S ⊆ V | gi(S) = 1}.
We also make the following assumption about the vulnerable function.
Assumption 2. gi is non-decreasing for all i ∈ V , i.e., if T ⊆ S ⊆ V , then gi(T ) ≤ gi(S).
With the definitions above, the mis-classification rate can be written as the average of the vulnerable
functions: h(S) = 1N
∑N
i=1 gi(S). By Assumption 2, h is also clearly non-decreasing.
We further define the basic vulnerable set to characterize the minimal attack sets that can lead a target
node to being mis-classified.
4This is an assumption made by Xu et al. [23], which we list as Assumption 5 in Appendix A.1.
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Definition 3 (Basic Vulnerable Set). ∀i ∈ V , we call Bi ⊆ Ai a basic vulnerable set of i if,
1) ∅ /∈ Bi; if ∅ ∈ Ai, Bi = ∅;
2) if ∅ /∈ Ai, for any nonempty S ∈ Ai, there exists a T ∈ Bi s.t. T ⊆ S;
3) for any distinct S, T ∈ Bi, |S ∩ T | < min(|S|, |T |).
And the existence of such a basic vulnerable set is guaranteed by Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. For any i ∈ V , there exists a unique Bi.
The distribution of the sizes of the element sets of Bi is closely related to the perturbation strength on
the features. When the perturbation is small, we may have to perturb multiple nodes before the target
node is mis-classified, and thus the element sets of Bi will be large. When perturbation is relatively
large, we may be able to turn a target node to be mis-classified by perturbing a single node, if chosen
wisely. In this case Bi will have a lot of singleton sets.
Our following analysis (Proposition 3) shows that h has a diminishing-return effect if the vulnerable
sets of nodes on the graph present homophily (Assumption 3), which is common in real-world
networks, and the perturbation on features becomes considerably large (Assumption 4).
Assumption 3 (Homophily). ∀S ∈ ∪Ni=1Ai and |S| > 1, there are b(S) ≥ 1 nodes s.t., for any node
j among these nodes, S ∈ Aj .
Intuitively, the vulnerable sets present strong homophily if b(S)’s are large.
Assumption 4 (Considerable Perturbation). ∀S ∈ ∪Ni=1Ai and if |S| > 1, then there are dp(S)·b(S)e
nodes s.t., for any node j among these nodes, there exists a set T ⊆ S, |T | = 1, and T ∈ Aj . And
r
r+1 < p(S) ≤ 1.
Proposition 3. If Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, h is γ-approximately submodular for some 0 < γ < 1r ,
i.e., there exists a non-decreasing submodular function h˜ : 2V → R+, s.t. ∀S ⊆ V ,
(1− γ)h˜(S) ≤ h(S) ≤ (1 + γ)h˜(S).
As greedy methods are guaranteed to enjoy a constant approximation ratio for such approximately
submodular functions [7], Proposition 3 motivates us to develop a greedy correction procedure to
compensate the diminishing-return effect when calculating the importance scores.
The greedy correction procedure. We propose an iterative node selection procedure and apply two
greedy correction steps on top of the RWCS strategy, motivated by Assumption 3 and 4.
To accommodate Assumption 3, after each node is selected into the attack set, we exclude a k-hop
neighborhood of the selected node for next iteration, for a given constant integer k. The intuition
is that nodes in a local neighborhood may contribute to similar target nodes due to homophily. To
accommodate Assumption 4, we adopt an adaptive version of RWCS scores. First, we binarize the
L-step random walk transition matrix ML as M˜ , i.e.,[
M˜
]
ij
=
{
1, if [ML]ij is among Top-l of [ML]i and [ML]ij 6= 0,
0, otherwise, (4)
where l is a given constant integer. Next, we define a new adaptive influence score as a function of a
matrix Q: I˜i(Q) =
∑N
j=1[Q]ji. In the iterative node selection procedure, we initialize Q as M˜ . We
select the node with highest score I˜i(Q) subsequently. After each iteration, suppose we have selected
the node i in this iteration, we will update Q by setting to zero for all the rows where the elements of
the i-th column are 1. The underlying assumption of this operation is that, adding i to the selected
set is likely to mis-classify all the target nodes corresponding to the aforementioned rows, which
complies Assumption 4. We name this iterative procedure as the GC-RWCS (Greedily Corrected
RWCS) strategy, and summarize it in Algorithm 1 in Appendix A.3.
Finally, we want to mention that, while the derivation of RWCS and GC-RWCS requires the knowl-
edge of the number of layers L for GCN, we find that the empirical performance of the proposed attack
strategies are not sensitive w.r.t. the choice of L. Therefore, the proposed methods are applicable to
the black-box setup where we do not know the exact L of the model.
6
4 Experiments
4.1 Experiment Setup
GNN models. We evaluate the proposed attack strategies on two common GNN models, GCN [9]
and JK-Net [23]. For JK-Net, we test on its two variants, JKNetConcat and JKNetMaxpool, which
apply concatenation and element-wise max at last layer respectively. We set the number of layers for
GCN as 2 and the number of layers for both JK-Concat and JK-Maxpool as 7. The hidden size of
each layer is 32. For the training, we closely follow the hyper-parameter setup in Xu et al. [23].
Datasets. We adopt three citation networks, Citeseer, Cora, and Pubmed, which are standard node
classification benchmark datasets [24]. Following the setup of JK-Net [23], we randomly split each
dataset by 60%, 20%, and 20% for training, validation, and testing. And we draw 40 random splits.
Baseline methods for comparison. As we summarized in Section 2.1, our proposed black-box
adversarial attack setup is by far the most restricted, and none of existing attack strategies for GNN
can be applied. We compare the proposed attack strategies with baseline strategies by selecting nodes
with top centrality metrics. We compare with three well-known network metrics capturing different
aspects of node centrality: Degree, Betweenness, and PageRank and name the attack strategies
correspondingly. In classical network analysis literature [14], real-world networks are shown to be
fragile under attacks to high-centrality nodes. Therefore we believe these centrality metrics serve as
reasonable baselines under our restricted black-box setup. For the purpose of sanity check, we also
include a trivial baseline Random, which randomly selects the nodes to be attacked.
Hyper-parameters for GC-RWCS. For the proposed GC-RWCS strategy, we fix the number of
step L = 4, the neighbor-hop parameter k = 1 and the parameter l = 30 for the binarized M˜ in
Eq. (4) for all models on all datasets. Note that L = 4 is different from the number of layers of both
GCN and JK-Nets in our experiments. But we achieve effective attack performance. We also conduct
a sensitivity analysis in Appendix A.5 and demonstrate the proposed method is not sensitive w.r.t. L.
Nuisance parameters of the attack procedure. For each dataset, we fix the limit on the number of
nodes to attack, r, as 1% of the graph size. After the node selection step, we also need to specify
how to perturb the node features, i.e., the design of  in τ function in the optimization problem (2).
In a real-world scenario,  should be designed with domain knowledge about the classification task,
without access to the GNN models. In our experiments, we have to simulate the domain knowledge
due to the lack of semantic meaning of each individual feature in the benchmark datasets. Formally,
we construct the constant perturbation  ∈ RD as follows, for j = 1, 2, . . . , D,
j =
 λ · sign(
∑N
i=1
∂L(H,y)
∂Xij
), if j ∈ arg top-J
([∣∣∣∑Ni=1 ∂L(H,y)∂Xil ∣∣∣]l=1,2,...,D
)
,
0, otherwise,
(5)
where λ is the magnitude of modification. We fix J = b0.02Dc for all datasets. While gradients
of the model are involved, we emphasize that we only use extremely limited information of the
gradients: determining a few number of important features and the binary direction to perturb for
each selected feature, only at the global level by averaging gradients on all nodes. We believe
such coarse information is usually available from domain knowledge about the classification task.
The perturbation magnitude for each feature is fixed as a constant λ and is irrelevant to the model.
In addition, the same perturbation vector is added to the features of all the selected nodes. The
construction of the perturbation is totally independent of the selected nodes.
4.2 Experiment Results
Verifying the discrepancy between the loss and the mis-classification rate. We first provide em-
pirical evidence for the discrepancy between classification loss (cross-entropy) and mis-classification
rate. We compare the RWCS strategy to baseline strategies with varying perturbation strength as
measured by λ in Eq. (5). The results shown in Figure 1 are obtained by attacking GCN on Citeseer.
First, we observe that RWCS increases the classification loss almost linearly as λ increases, indicating
our approximation of the loss by first-order Taylor expansion actually works pretty well in practice.
Not surprisingly, RWCS performs very similarly as PageRank. And RWCS performs much better than
7
other centrality metrics in increasing the classification loss, showing the effectiveness of Proposition 1.
However, we see the decrease of classification accuracy when attacked by RWCS (and PageRank)
quickly saturates as λ increases. The GC-RWCS strategy that is proposed to correct the importance
scores is able to decreases the classification accuracy the most as λ becomes larger, although it
increases the classification loss the least.
(a) Loss on Test Set (b) Accuracy on Test Set
Figure 1: Experiments of attacking GCN on Citeseer with increasing perturbation strength λ. Results
are averaged over 40 random trials and error bars indicate standard error of mean.
Full experiment results. We then provide the full experiment results of attacking GCN, JKNetCon-
cat, and JKNetMaxpool on all three datasets in Table 1. The perturbation strength is set as λ = 1.
The thresholds 10% and 30% indicate that we set the limit on the maximum degree m as the lowest
degree of the top 10% and 30% nodes respectively.
The results clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed GC-RWCS strategy. GC-RWCS
achieves the best attack performance on almost all experiment settings, and the difference to the
second-best strategy is significant in almost all cases. It is also worth noting that the proposed GC-
RWCS strategy is able to decrease the node classification accuracy by up to 33.5%, and GC-RWCS
achieves a 70% larger decrease of the accuracy than the Random baseline in most cases (see Table 4
in Appendix A.5). And this is achieved by merely adding the same constant perturbation vector to
the features of 1% of the nodes in the graph. This verifies that the explicit structural inductive biases
of GNN models make them vulnerable even in the extremely restricted black-box attack setup.
Table 1: Summary of the attack performance. The lower the accuracy (in %) the better the attacks.
The bold marker denotes the best performance. The asterisk (*) means the difference between the
best strategy and the second-best strategy is statistically significant by a t-test at significance level
0.05. The error bar (±) denotes the standard error of the mean by 40 independent trials.
Cora Citeseer Pubmed
Method GCN JKNetConcat JKNetMaxpool GCN JKNetConcat JKNetMaxpool GCN JKNetConcat JKNetMaxpool
None 85.6 ± 0.3 86.2 ± 0.2 85.8 ± 0.3 75.1 ± 0.2 72.9 ± 0.3 73.2 ± 0.3 85.7 ± 0.1 85.8 ± 0.1 85.7 ± 0.1
Threshold 10%
Random 81.3 ± 0.3 68.8 ± 0.8 68.8 ± 1.3 71.3 ± 0.3 60.8 ± 0.8 61.7 ± 0.9 82.0 ± 0.3 75.9 ± 0.7 75.4 ± 0.7
Degree 78.2 ± 0.4 60.7 ± 1.0 59.9 ± 1.5 67.5 ± 0.4 52.5 ± 0.8 53.7 ± 1.0 78.9 ± 0.5 63.4 ± 1.0 63.3 ± 1.2
Pagerank 79.4 ± 0.4 71.6 ± 0.6 70.0 ± 1.0 70.1 ± 0.3 61.5 ± 0.5 62.6 ± 0.6 80.3 ± 0.3 71.3 ± 0.8 71.2 ± 0.8
Betweenness 79.7 ± 0.4 60.5 ± 0.9 60.3 ± 1.6 68.9 ± 0.3 53.5 ± 0.8 55.1 ± 1.0 78.5 ± 0.6 67.1 ± 1.1 66.2 ± 1.1
RWCS 79.5 ± 0.3 71.2 ± 0.5 69.9 ± 1.0 69.9 ± 0.3 60.8 ± 0.6 62.2 ± 0.7 79.8 ± 0.3 70.7 ± 0.8 70.7 ± 0.8
GC-RWCS 78.5 ± 0.5 52.7 ± 1.0* 53.3 ± 1.9* 65.1 ± 0.5* 46.6 ± 0.8* 48.2 ± 1.1* 77.3 ± 0.7 62.1 ± 1.2 60.6 ± 1.4*
Threshold 30%
Random 82.6 ± 0.4 70.7 ± 1.1 71.8 ± 1.1 72.6 ± 0.3 62.7 ± 0.8 63.9 ± 0.8 82.6 ± 0.2 77.3 ± 0.4 77.4 ± 0.5
Degree 80.7 ± 0.4 64.9 ± 1.4 67.0 ± 1.5 70.4 ± 0.4 56.9 ± 0.8 58.7 ± 0.9 81.5 ± 0.4 72.4 ± 0.7 72.3 ± 0.7
Pagerank 82.6 ± 0.3 79.6 ± 0.4 79.7 ± 0.4 72.9 ± 0.2 70.2 ± 0.3 70.3 ± 0.3 83.0 ± 0.2 79.3 ± 0.3 79.6 ± 0.3
Betweenness 81.8 ± 0.4 64.1 ± 1.3 65.9 ± 1.4 70.7 ± 0.3 56.3 ± 0.8 58.3 ± 0.9 81.3 ± 0.3 74.1 ± 0.5 74.6 ± 0.5
RWCS 82.8 ± 0.3 79.3 ± 0.5 79.5 ± 0.4 72.9 ± 0.2 69.8 ± 0.3 70.1 ± 0.3 82.1 ± 0.2 77.8 ± 0.3 78.4 ± 0.3
GC-RWCS 80.7 ± 0.5 59.1 ± 1.6* 61.1 ± 1.6* 67.8 ± 0.5* 49.0 ± 0.9* 50.7 ± 1.1* 80.3 ± 0.5* 69.2 ± 0.7* 70.0 ± 0.7*
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel black-box adversarial attack setup for GNN models with constraint
of limited node access, which we believe is by far the most restricted and realistic black-box attack
setup. Nonetheless, through both theoretical analyses and empirical experiments, we demonstrate
that the strong and explicit structural inductive biases of GNN models make them still vulnerable to
this type of adversarial attacks. We also propose a principled attack strategy, GC-RWCS, based on
our theoretical analyses on the connection between the GCN model and random walk, which corrects
the diminishing-return effect of the mis-classification rate. Our experimental results show that the
proposed strategy significantly outperforms competing attack strategies under the same setup.
8
Broader Impact
For the potential positive impacts, we anticipate that the work may raise the public attention about
the security and accountability issues of graph-based machine learning techniques, especially when
they are applied to real-world social networks. Even without accessing any information about the
model training, the graph structure alone can be exploited to damage a deep learning framework with
a rather executable strategy.
On the potential negative side, as our work demonstrates that there is a chance to attack existing GNN
models effectively without any knowledge but a simple graph structure, this may expose a serious
alert to technology companies who maintain the platforms and operate various applications based
on the graphs. However, we believe making this security concern transparent can help practitioners
detect potential attack in this form and better defend the machine learning driven applications.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We first remind the reader for some notations, a GCN model is denoted as a function f , the feature
matrix is X ∈ RN×D, and the output logits H = f(X) ∈ RN×K . The L-step random walk
transition matrix is ML. More details can be found in in Section 3.1
We give in Lemma 1 the connection between GCN models and random walks. Lemma 1 relies on a
technical assumption about the GCN model (Assumption 5) and the proof can be found in Xu et al.
[23].
Assumption 5 (Xu et al. [23]). All paths in the computation graph of the given GCN model are
independently activated with the same probability of success ρ.
Lemma 1. (Xu et al. [23].) Given an L-layer GCN with averaging as αi,j = 1/di in Eq. 1, assume
that all path in the computation graph of the model are activated with the same probability of success
ρ (Assumption 5). Then, for any node i, j ∈ V ,
E
[
∂Hj
∂Xi
]
= ρ ·
1∏
l=L
Wl[M
L]ji, (6)
whereWl is the learnable parameter at l-th layer.
Then we are able to prove Proposition 1 below.
Proof. First, we derive the gradient of the loss L(H, y) w.r.t. the feature Xi of node i,
∇XiL(H, y) = ∇Xi
 N∑
j=1
Lj(Hj , yj)

=
N∑
j=1
∇XiLj(Hj , yj)
=
N∑
j=1
(
∂Hj
∂Xi
)T
∂Lj(Hj , yj)
∂Hj
, (7)
where Hj is the jth row of H but being transposed as column vectors and yj is the true label of node
j. Note that ∂Lj(Hj ,yj)∂Hj ∈ RK , and
∂Hj
∂Xi
∈ RK×D.
Next, we plug Eq. 7 into ∆˜i (x) |x=τ(X,{i})i . For simplicity, We write ∆˜i (x) |x=τ(X,{i})i as ∆˜i in
the rest of the proof.
∆˜i = (∇XiL(H, y))T 
=
N∑
j=1
(
∂Lj(Hj , yj)
∂Hj
)T
∂Hj
∂Xi
. (8)
Denote aj , ∂Lj(Hj ,yj)∂Hj ∈ RK . From the definition of loss
Lj(Hj , yj) =
N∑
j=1
max
k∈{1,...,K}
Hjk −Hjyj ,
we have
ajk =

−1, if k = yj and yj 6= argmaxc∈{1,...,K}Hjc,
1, if k 6= yj and k = argmaxc∈{1,...,K}Hjc,
0, otherwise,
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for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Under Assumption 1, the expectation of each element of aj is
E[ajk] = −qk(1− p(k | k)) +
K∑
w=1,w 6=k
p(k | w)qw, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
which is a constant independent of Hj and yj . Therefore, we can write
E[aj ] = c,∀j = 1, 2, . . . , N,
where c ∈ RK is a constant vector independent of j.
Taking expectation of Eq. (8) and plug in the result of Lemma 1,
E
[
∆˜i
]
≈ E
 N∑
j=1
(
∂Lj(Hj , yj)
∂Hj
)T
∂Hj
∂Xi


=
N∑
j=1
E[aj ]T
(
ρ
1∏
l=L
Wl[M
L]ji
)

=
(
ρcT
1∏
l=L
Wl
)
N∑
j=1
[ML]ji
= C
N∑
j=1
[ML]ji,
where C = ρcT
∏1
l=LWl is a constant scalar independent of i.
A.2 Proofs for Propositions in Section 3.4
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. If Ai = ∅, Bi ⊆ Ai so Bi = ∅. The three conditions of Definition 3 are also trivially true.
Below we investigate the case Ai 6= ∅.
The existence can be given by a constructive proof. We check the nonempty elements in Ai one by
one with any order. If this element is a super set of any other element in Ai, we skip it. Otherwise,
we put it into Bi. Then we verify that the resulted Bi is a basic vulnerable set for i. Bi ⊆ Ai. For
condition 1), clearly, ∅ /∈ Bi and if ∅ ∈ Ai, all nonempty elements in Ai are skipped so Bi = ∅. For
condition 2), given ∅ /∈ Ai, for any nonempty S ∈ Ai, if S ∈ Bi, the condition holds. If S /∈ Bi, by
construction, there exists a nonempty strict subset S1 ⊂ S and S1 ∈ Ai. If S1 ∈ Bi, the condition
holds. If S1 /∈ Bi, we can similarly find a nonempty strict subset S2 ⊂ S and S2 ∈ Ai. Recursively,
we can get a series S ⊃ S1 ⊃ S2 ⊃ · · · . As S is finite, we will have a set Sk that no longer has strict
subset so Sk ∈ Bi. Therefore the condition holds. Condition 3) means any set in Bi is not a subset
of another set in Bi. This condition holds by construction.
Now we prove the uniqueness. Suppose there are two distinct basic vulnerable sets Bi 6= Ci. Without
loss of generality, we assume S ∈ Bi but S /∈ Ci. Bi 6= ∅ so ∅ /∈ Ai. Further S ∈ Ai, hence Ci 6= ∅.
As S ∈ Bi ⊆ Ai, S 6= ∅, and Ci satisfies condition 2), there will be a nonempty T ∈ Ci s.t. T ⊂ S.
If T ∈ Bi, then condition 3) is violated for Bi. If T /∈ Bi, there will be a nonempty T ′ ∈ Bi s.t.
T ′ ⊂ T . But T ′ ⊂ S also violates condition 3). By contradiction we prove the uniqueness.
In order to prove Proposition 3, we first would like to construct a submodular function that is close to
h, with the help of Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 2. If ∀i ∈ V , Bi is either empty or only contains singleton sets, then h is submodular.
Proof. We first prove the case when ∀i ∈ V,Ai 6= ∅.
First, we show that ∀i ∈ V , if Ai 6= ∅, for any nonempty S ⊆ V, gi(S) = 1 if and only if Bi = ∅
or ∃T ∈ Bi, T ⊆ S. On one hand, if gi(S) = 1, then S ∈ Ai. If ∅ ∈ Ai, Bi = ∅. If ∅ /∈ Ai, by
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condition 2) of the basic vulnerable set, ∃T ∈ Bi, T ⊆ S. On the other hand, if ∃T ∈ Bi, T ⊆ S,
gi(T ) = 1, by Assumption 2, gi(S) ≥ gi(T ), so gi(S) = 1. If Bi = ∅, as Ai 6= ∅, if ∅ /∈ Ai, the
condition 2) of Definition 3 will be violated. Therefore ∅ ∈ Ai so gi(∅) = 1. Still by Assumption 2,
gi(S) ≥ gi(∅), so gi(S) = 1.
Define a function e : V → 2V s.t. for any node i ∈ V ,
e(i) = {j ∈ V | {i} ∈ Bj}.
Given Bi is either empty or only contains singleton sets for any i ∈ V , for any nonempty S ⊆ V
h(S) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
gi(S) (9)
=
1
N
|{j ∈ V | Bj = ∅ or ∃T ∈ Bj , T ⊆ S}|
=
1
N
|{j ∈ V | Bj = ∅ or ∃{i} ∈ Bj , i ∈ S}|
=
1
N
|{j ∈ V | Bj = ∅ or ∃i ∈ S, {i} ∈ Bj}|
=
1
N
(|∪i∈Se(i)|+ |{j ∈ V | Bj = ∅}|) .
|{j ∈ V | Bj = ∅}| is a constant independent of S. Therefore, maximizing h(S) over S with |S| ≤ r
is equivalent to maximizing |∪i∈Se(i)| over S with |S| ≤ r, which is a maximum coverage problem.
Therefore h is submodular.
The case of allowing some nodes to have empty vulnerable sets can be easily proved by removing
such nodes in Eq. (9) as their corresponding vulnerable functions always equal to zero.
Proof of Proposition 3. For simplicity, we assume Ai 6= ∅ for any i ∈ V . The proof below can
be easily adapted to the general case without this assumption, by removing the nodes with empty
vulnerable sets similarly as the proof for Lemma 2.
Proof. ∀i ∈ V , define B˜i , {S ∈ Bi | |S| = 1}. We can then define a new group of vulnerable sets
A˜i on V for i ∈ V . Let
A˜i =

2V , if Bi = ∅,
∅, Bi 6= ∅ but B˜i = ∅,
{S ⊆ V | ∃T ∈ B˜i, T ⊆ S}, otherwise.
Then it is clear that B˜i is a valid basic vulnerable set corresponding to A˜i, for i ∈ V . If we define
g˜i : 2
V → {0, 1} as
g˜i(S) =
{
1, if Bi = ∅ or ∃T ∈ B˜i, T ⊆ S,
0, otherwise,
we can easily verify that g˜i is a valid vulnerable function corresponding to A˜i, for i ∈ V . Further let
h˜ : 2V → R+ as
h˜(S) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
g˜i(S).
By Lemma 2, as ∀i ∈ V, B˜i is either empty or only contains singleton sets, we know h˜ is submodular.
Next we investigate the difference between h and h˜. First, for any S ⊆ V , if S /∈ ∪Ni=1Ai, clearly
h(S) = h˜(S) = 0; if |S| ≤ 1, it’s easy to show h(S) = h˜(S). Second, for any S ∈ ∪Ni=1Ai and|S| > 1, by Assumption 3, there are exactly b (omitting the S in b(S)) nodes whose vulnerable set
contains S. Without loss of generality, let us assume the indexes of b nodes are 1, 2, . . . , b. Then, for
any node i > b, gi(S) = 0, g˜i(S) = 0. For node i = 1, 2, . . . , b, gi(S) = 1, and
g˜i(S) =
{
1, if Bi = ∅ or ∃T ⊆ S, |T | = 1 and T ∈ B˜i,
0, otherwise.
By Assumption 4, there are at least dpbe (omitting the S in p(S)) nodes like j s.t. g˜j(S) = 1.
Therefore, h(S) = bN and
dpbe
N ≤ h˜(S) ≤ bN . Hence 1− 1r < 1 ≤ h(S)h˜(S) ≤ 1p < 1 + 1r .
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A.3 Algorithm Details of GC-RWCS
We summarize the GC-RWCS strategy in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: The GC-RWCS Strategy for Node Selection.
Input: number of nodes limit r; maximum degree limit m; neighbor hops k; binarized transition
matrix M˜ ; the adaptive influence score function I˜i,∀i ∈ V .
Output: the set S to be attacked.
1 Initialize the candidate set P = {i ∈ V | di ≤ m}, and the score matrix Q = M˜ ;
2 Initialize S = ∅;
3 for t = 1, 2, . . . , r do
4 z ← argmaxi∈P I˜i(Q);
5 S ← S ∪ {z};
6 P ← P \ {i ∈ P | shortest-path(i, z) ≤ k};
7 q ← Q·,z;
8 for i ∈ V do
9 if qi is 1 then
10 Qi ← 0;
11 return S;
A.4 Additional Experiment Details
Datasets. We adopt the Deep Graph Library [17] version of Cora, Citeseer, and Pubmed in our
experiments. The summary statistics of the datasets are summarized in Table 2. The number of edges
does not include self-loops.
Table 2: Summary statistics of datasets.
Dataset Nodes Edges Classes Features
Citeseer 3,327 4,552 6 3,703
Cora 2,708 5,278 7 1,433
Pubmed 19,717 44,324 3 500
A.5 Additional Experiment Results
In this section, we provide results of more experiment setups and conduct a sensitivity analysis of
the hyper-parameter L in GC-RWCS in Table 3. We provide a setup of 20% threshold in addition to
the 10% and 30% thresholds shown in Section 4.2, to give a better resolution of the results. And the
results of threshold 20% are consistent with other setups. We also show the results of GC-RWCS
with L = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Note that GCN has 2 layers and the JK-Nets have 7 layers. The variations of
GC-RWCS results with the provided range of L are typically within 2%, indicating that the proposed
GC-RWCS strategy does not rely on the exact knowledge of number of layers in the GNN models to
be effective.
Further, we also compare the relative decrease of accuracy between the proposed GC-RWCS strategy
(L = 4) and the Random strategy in Table 4. GC-RWCS is able to decrease the node classification
accuracy by up to 33.5%, and achieves a 70% larger decrease of the accuracy than the Random
baseline in most cases. As the GC-RWCS and Random use exactly the same feature perturbation
and the node selection step of Random does not include any information of the graph structure, this
relative comparison can be roughly viewed as an indicator of the attack effectiveness attributed to the
structural inductive biases of the GNN models.
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Table 3: Summary of the accuracy (in %) when L = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. The bold number and the asterisk
(*) denotes the same meaning as Table 1. The underline marker denotes the values of GC-RWCS
outperforms all the baseline.
Cora Citeseer Pubmed
Method GCN JKNetConcat JKNetMaxpool GCN JKNetConcat JKNetMaxpool GCN JKNetConcat JKNetMaxpool
None 85.6 ± 0.3 86.2 ± 0.2 85.8 ± 0.3 75.1 ± 0.2 72.9 ± 0.3 73.2 ± 0.3 85.7 ± 0.1 85.8 ± 0.1 85.7 ± 0.1
Threshold 10%
Random 81.3 ± 0.3 68.8 ± 0.8 68.8 ± 1.3 71.3 ± 0.3 60.8 ± 0.8 61.7 ± 0.9 82.0 ± 0.3 75.9 ± 0.7 75.2 ± 0.7
Degree 78.2 ± 0.4 60.7 ± 1.0 59.9 ± 1.5 67.5 ± 0.4 52.5 ± 0.8 53.7 ± 1.0 78.9 ± 0.5 63.4 ± 1.0 63.2 ± 1.2
Pagerank 79.4 ± 0.4 71.6 ± 0.6 70.0 ± 1.0 70.1 ± 0.3 61.5 ± 0.5 62.6 ± 0.6 80.3 ± 0.3 71.3 ± 0.8 71.2 ± 0.8
Betweenness 79.7 ± 0.4 60.5 ± 0.9 60.3 ± 1.6 68.9 ± 0.3 53.5 ± 0.8 55.1 ± 1.0 78.5 ± 0.6 67.1 ± 1.1 66.1 ± 1.1
RWCS 79.4 ± 0.4 71.7 ± 0.5 70.3 ± 0.9 69.9 ± 0.3 62.4 ± 0.4 63.1 ± 0.6 79.8 ± 0.3 70.7 ± 0.8 70.7 ± 0.8
GC-RWCS-3 78.6 ± 0.5 52.1 ± 1.1* 53.0 ± 1.9* 64.8 ± 0.5* 46.4 ± 0.8* 48.2 ± 1.0* 78.1 ± 0.6 62.3 ± 1.2 61.6 ± 1.5
GC-RWCS-4 78.5 ± 0.5 52.7 ± 1.0* 53.3 ± 1.9* 65.1 ± 0.5* 46.6 ± 0.8* 48.2 ± 1.1* 77.3 ± 0.7 62.1 ± 1.2 60.6 ± 1.4*
GC-RWCS-5 78.9 ± 0.5 53.5 ± 1.1* 54.2 ± 1.9* 65.3 ± 0.5* 46.6 ± 0.8* 48.4 ± 1.0* 78.4 ± 0.5 64.2 ± 1.2 62.5 ± 1.4
GC-RWCS-6 78.5 ± 0.5 54.3 ± 1.1* 54.9 ± 1.9* 65.5 ± 0.5* 47.1 ± 0.8 48.9 ± 1.1* 78.0 ± 0.6 63.7 ± 1.1 62.6 ± 1.4
GC-RWCS-7 78.1 ± 0.5 54.2 ± 1.1* 54.8 ± 1.9* 66.1 ± 0.4* 47.5 ± 0.8 49.3 ± 1.1* 78.7 ± 0.5 64.9 ± 1.2 63.3 ± 1.3
Threshold 20%
Random 82.3 ± 0.3 71.7 ± 1.1 69.8 ± 1.1 72.1 ± 0.3 62.1 ± 0.7 62.6 ± 0.9 82.6 ± 0.2 77.9 ± 0.5 77.5 ± 0.5
Degree 79.3 ± 0.4 64.2 ± 1.2 61.6 ± 1.3 69.2 ± 0.4 56.0 ± 0.8 56.4 ± 1.0 80.6 ± 0.4 69.5 ± 0.8 69.4 ± 1.0
Pagerank 80.8 ± 0.3 74.5 ± 0.8 73.0 ± 0.8 72.1 ± 0.3 68.3 ± 0.3 68.2 ± 0.4 82.2 ± 0.2 77.7 ± 0.4 77.8 ± 0.4
Betweenness 80.7 ± 0.4 62.2 ± 1.4 60.1 ± 1.4 70.1 ± 0.4 54.8 ± 0.8 55.8 ± 1.1 80.2 ± 0.4 72.4 ± 0.8 72.0 ± 0.7
RWCS 81.4 ± 0.3 76.8 ± 0.6 76.0 ± 0.6 72.4 ± 0.3 68.9 ± 0.3 69.0 ± 0.4 81.3 ± 0.2 76.0 ± 0.4 76.5 ± 0.4
GC-RWCS-3 79.4 ± 0.5 57.5 ± 1.6* 53.1 ± 1.5* 67.1 ± 0.4* 48.4 ± 0.9* 49.3 ± 1.2* 79.0 ± 0.5* 67.4 ± 0.9* 66.3 ± 1.0*
GC-RWCS-4 79.4 ± 0.5 57.5 ± 1.7* 53.2 ± 1.4* 67.3 ± 0.5* 47.9 ± 0.9* 48.8 ± 1.3* 79.0 ± 0.5* 67.4 ± 1.0* 66.3 ± 1.0*
GC-RWCS-5 79.4 ± 0.5 59.0 ± 1.7* 54.5 ± 1.4* 67.3 ± 0.4* 48.4 ± 0.9* 49.4 ± 1.3* 79.2 ± 0.5* 68.5 ± 0.9 68.1 ± 0.9
GC-RWCS-6 79.5 ± 0.5 59.3 ± 1.7 54.9 ± 1.5* 68.1 ± 0.4* 49.2 ± 0.9* 50.2 ± 1.3* 79.1 ± 0.5* 68.4 ± 0.9 68.5 ± 1.0
GC-RWCS-7 79.4 ± 0.5 59.3 ± 1.6 55.3 ± 1.5* 68.1 ± 0.4* 50.0 ± 0.9* 50.8 ± 1.3* 79.2 ± 0.5* 68.7 ± 0.9 68.2 ± 0.8
Threshold 30%
Random 82.6 ± 0.4 70.7 ± 1.1 71.8 ± 1.1 72.6 ± 0.3 62.7 ± 0.8 63.9 ± 0.8 82.6 ± 0.2 77.3 ± 0.4 77.3 ± 0.5
Degree 80.7 ± 0.4 64.9 ± 1.4 67.0 ± 1.5 70.4 ± 0.4 56.9 ± 0.8 58.7 ± 0.9 81.5 ± 0.4 72.4 ± 0.7 72.1 ± 0.8
Pagerank 82.6 ± 0.3 79.6 ± 0.4 79.7 ± 0.4 72.9 ± 0.2 70.2 ± 0.3 70.3 ± 0.3 83.0 ± 0.2 79.3 ± 0.3 79.5 ± 0.3
Betweenness 81.8 ± 0.4 64.1 ± 1.3 65.9 ± 1.4 70.7 ± 0.3 56.3 ± 0.8 58.3 ± 0.9 81.3 ± 0.3 74.1 ± 0.5 74.5 ± 0.5
RWCS 82.9 ± 0.3 79.7 ± 0.4 80.0 ± 0.4 72.9 ± 0.2 70.2 ± 0.3 70.4 ± 0.3 82.1 ± 0.2 77.8 ± 0.3 78.4 ± 0.3
GC-RWCS-3 80.2 ± 0.6 57.3 ± 1.7* 59.0 ± 1.6* 67.9 ± 0.5* 49.1 ± 0.9* 50.8 ± 1.1* 80.3 ± 0.5* 69.0 ± 0.7* 69.8 ± 0.7*
GC-RWCS-4 80.7 ± 0.5 59.1 ± 1.6* 61.1 ± 1.6* 67.8 ± 0.5* 49.0 ± 0.9* 50.7 ± 1.1* 80.3 ± 0.5* 69.2 ± 0.7* 70.0 ± 0.7*
GC-RWCS-5 80.8 ± 0.5 59.8 ± 1.6* 61.5 ± 1.6* 68.4 ± 0.5* 49.2 ± 0.9* 51.2 ± 1.1* 80.2 ± 0.5* 70.4 ± 0.6* 71.5 ± 0.6
GC-RWCS-6 80.7 ± 0.5 59.8 ± 1.5* 61.4 ± 1.5* 68.5 ± 0.5* 50.5 ± 0.9* 52.2 ± 1.1* 80.2 ± 0.5* 70.5 ± 0.5* 71.6 ± 0.6
GC-RWCS-7 80.7 ± 0.5 60.2 ± 1.5* 61.9 ± 1.5* 68.7 ± 0.5* 50.7 ± 0.9* 52.6 ± 1.1* 80.3 ± 0.4* 70.9 ± 0.5* 71.9 ± 0.6
Table 4: Accuracy decrease (in %) comparison with clean dataset
Cora Citeseer Pubmed
Method GCN JKNetConcat JKNetMaxpool GCN JKNetConcat JKNetMaxpool GCN JKNetConcat JKNetMaxpool
Threshold 10%
Random 4.3 17.4 17 3.8 12.1 11.5 3.7 9.9 10.3
GC-RWCS 7.1 33.5 32.5 10.0 26.3 25.0 8.4 23.7 25.1
GC-RWCS/Random 165.12% 192.53% 191.18% 263.16% 217.36% 217.39% 227.03% 239.39% 243.69%
Threshold 30%
Random 3.0 15.5 14 2.5 10.2 9.3 3.1 8.5 8.3
GC-RWCS 4.9 27.1 24.7 7.3 23.9 22.5 5.4 16.6 15.7
GC-RWCS/Random 163.33% 174.84% 176.43% 292.00% 234.31% 241.94% 174.19% 195.29% 189.16%
15
